Before getting into this week’s blog, let me wish all my readers a wonderful and meaningful Easter!
In February, 2006 Bear Stearns, the New York investment brokerage firm, approved a bonus pool of up to $305 million for 13 staff members, or more than $20 million each. That same year Lehman Brothers disclosed that it would pay its average employee $335,441 on net income of $4.0 billion. That was fine with me. I figured that these big boys were capitalists of the first order and that those fellows on Wall Street must have earned their keep to receive salaries and bonuses like that.
This was the same time that bankers were processing sub-prime real estate mortgages in large numbers. These loans included low “teaser rates” for the first three or five years, with higher interest rates later. Many of the mortgages were processed as “no doc” loans, meaning that the borrowers weren’t required to document their income, assets, or liabilities to gain loan approval. These “no doc” loans later became known in the industry as “liar loans”. Some of the loans were made for as much as 120% of the appraisal values, which had been rising steadily for several years.
Assuming that housing prices would continue to rise at 6-10% every year and assuming that refinancing would be available at low, fixed rates before the “teaser” rates morphed into their previously disclosed higher rates, homeowners just might come out all right. The problem with assumptions is that they don’t always work out. Many of the borrowers were naïve folks who were just trying to get into their first home or were attempting to move into larger homes they couldn’t afford. However, there were also large numbers of speculators who bought several properties, hoping to ride the “equity wave” a couple of more years and sell the homes at a nice profit. In the end, it really didn’t matter; these were risky loans made to unqualified borrowers, by lenders who should have known better.
The mortgage lenders, whether they were large national outfits like Countrywide, internet lenders like DiTech, or your local banker down the street, were basically middlemen, who sold the mortgage loans to investment banking firms like Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns “packaged” these home loans into mortgaged-backed bonds, which were sold to large banks and other institutional investors. These “hedge funds” don’t actually limit risk, but through the use of short selling and other derivative contracts may actually increase risk of default. Hedge funds also charge high fees and can be extremely profitable to firms like Bear Stearns. After some time, hedge funds represented up to 30% of the portfolios of large banks and institutional investors throughout the world. During these “good times” firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers made billions in profits from these funds, enabling them to pay large bonuses for key employees.
Now matter how well you dress up a pig, it is still a pig. Hedge funds were crappy investment vehicles with a high default risk. As home loan teaser rates expired and mortgages cycled into higher interest rates, borrowers tried to refinance their homes, many of which had actually gone down in value. As people started to default on their house payments, hedge funds faltered. Holders of sub prime backed securities started to lose money. The big guys like Bear Stearns were running out of cash and their large institutional customers were finally reaping their well-deserved losses. Between January and March, 2008 Bear Stearns stock fell from $90 a share to $2.84 a share. On March 17, 2008 Bear Stearns was purchased by JPMorgan Chase for a mere $2 per share, but not before the central bank of the United States Government, the Federal Reserve System, agreed to guarantee up to $30 billion of Bear Stearns’ lousy securities for the benefit of JPMorgan.
By opening its discount window to JPMorgan, the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) started a new precedent. Prior to last week, the Fed opened its discount window only to banks. For the first time in history, the discount window is now open to investment banking and brokerage firms. In essence, the Fed will now allow shaky and irresponsible investment bankers to exchange their bad loans for cash. The Fed might as well be accepting cereal box tops as collateral from some of these investment bankers! By monetizing the bad loans of investment bankers, the Fed will create either inflation or higher interest rates, the costs of which will be paid by taxpayers and consumers.
A huge moral hazard problem has been created. The large investment banking houses have been given tacit permission by the Fed to act irresponsibly anytime in the future, knowing they will always have the Fed to buy their cruddy loans. The mega banks are free to pay high salaries and extravagant bonuses during the good times, but are conveniently insulated from losses during the bad times. That’s not my understanding of Capitalism.
The Capitalism I am familiar with is the best economic system on the face of the earth. People and businesses are free to take risk, make investments, and even to invent new financial products, with the understanding that they will reap the profits or losses inherent in their activities. When you serve consumers well and provide them with a superior product or service at a reasonable price, you stand to make a profit. When you’re stupid and offer inferior products or services, you’re supposed to suffer losses, even to the extent that you lose your business and fortune.
If my businesses suffer losses, I don’t think that we will be able to get a loan at the Fed discount window. These days, I guess Capitalism is just for the little guys.